DDASaccident719 by Database, Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident
James Madison University
JMU Scholarly Commons
Global CWD Repository Center for International Stabilization and Recovery
12-22-2010
DDASaccident719
Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database
AID
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons,
Public Policy Commons, and the Social Policy Commons
This Other is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Global CWD Repository by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact dc_admin@jmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Database, Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident, "DDASaccident719" (2010). Global CWD Repository. 918.
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd/918
DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details  
Report date: 08/07/2011 Accident number: 719 
Accident time: 09:30 Accident Date: 22/12/2010 
Where it occurred: AF/0112/00169, 
MF355, Shpoli Baba 
Village, Sorubi District, 
Kabul Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Other Date of main report: Not recorded 
ID original source: None Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: hard 
rocks/stones 
steep slope 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 08/07/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate area marking (?) 
 
Accident report 
A Board of Inquiry report and a Lessons Learned document have been made available. Their 
conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost. Text in 
square brackets [ ] is editorial.  
The documents are reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
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BOARD OF INQUIRY ABOUT FATAL DEMINING ACCIDENT of [the Victim] deminer of 
[Demining group] DT-13  
INTRODUCTION 
Dr [Name removed], Programme Director for the Mine Action Coordination Centre of 
Afghanistan (MACCA) convened a Board of Inquiry (BOI) team to investigate the 
circumstances involved in the demining accident causing fatal injuries to [the Victim] the 
deminer of [Demining group] DT-13. 
The BOI comprised the following personnel: 
Dr. [Name removed] Chief of QM MACCA: Chairman 
[Name removed]: Member 
[Name removed]: Member 
[Name removed] from [Demining group] Observer 
A copy of the appointment of personnel to carry out the formal investigation including the BOI 
Terms of Reference is at Annex A to this report. 
GEOGRAPHY AND WEATHER 
The accident occurred on 22 Dec 2010 in MF # AF/0112/00169/MF 355 located in Shpoli 
Baba village, Sorubi district of Kabul province to the east side of Kabul city at the begging of 
Mahipar Pass closed to Mahipar Power plant. This is a rocky area, hillside with a steep 
sloping terrain. It is cold in winter season, but due to lack of snowfall this year, the weather is 
suitable for demining operations. The ground is medium in terms of hardness and dry. The 
area is lightly bushy. Accident happened in a clear and calm weather.    
Priority of Task 
Although 8 accidents happened there on local people and on their animals since 1980, and 
the clearance of the area is requested by Government and is covered in [Demining group] 
plan, but the priority of the task is identified as low.  
SITE LAYOUT AND MARKING 
The site marking was visible, the admin area was well arranged and visible, but the access 
lanes were not well prepared and marked. This point was not raised during the internal and 
external QA visits.    
MANAGEMENT, SUPERVISION AND DISCIPLINE ON SITE 
Although the site layout, deployment of deminers, safety distance, medic post, admin area, 
control point and vehicle parking area were well managed. But as the area was steep sloping 
and extra safety and precautionary measures in terms of preparing steps for deminers’ 
stabilization and using ropes/sticks to tie deminers during the operations were not considered. 
These precautionary measures were discussed by operations assistant, but the team 
command group refused and said that the nature of is loose and sticks will not be driven to 
the ground to tie the rope with.  
QUALITY ASSURANCE AND QUALITY CONTROL 
Internal QA was conducted on 20/12/2010 and external site visit was conducted by AMAC 
relevant Operations Assistant on 29/11/2010 which was the second day of the team 
deployment in this task. The result of this visit was CR.   
COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTING 
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The communication between team, sub-office and organization HQ was maintained very well.  
MEDICAL REPORTS 
The medical report of ICRC hospital Pakistan/Peshawar is available. [Not made available.] 
The report states that the victim deminer died due to head trauma and internal chest injuries 
which caused broncho-pneumonia and septicemia leading to cardio-respiratory failure.  
WITNESS INTERVIEWS AND STATEMENTS 
The team leader, assistant team leader, the team medic and nearest deminer to the accident 
point were interviewed by external investigation team and statements are attached as Annex 
E. [Not made available.] 
DETAILS OF THE MINE/ERW INVOLVED 
It was a Russian made anti-personnel PMN mine.  
EVIDENCE OF RE-MINING 
No evidence of re-mining. 
EVIDENCE OF SITE INTERFERENCE OR TAMPERING AFTER THE ACCIDENT 
The accident site was not tempered.  
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT 
The deminer was dressed with PPE and visor. He got fatal injuries due to falling around 200 
meters down in a rocky area. 
USE OF MINE DETECTION DOGS (MDD) 
Not suitable. 
USE OF Mechanical MACHINES (MDU) 
Not suitable. 
DATE OF LAST REVISION COURSE FOR TEAM INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT 
At the beginning of each mission [Demining group] teams are subject to one day refresher 
course and the last course was held on 27 Nov 2010 in Sorubi base camp, but [Demining 
group] representative was not able to provide documentary evidence to confirm [the Victim]’s 
presence in mentioned refresher course. The BOI team received a record of weekly technical 
review which is being conducted by team command group in the base camp on Fridays, [the 
Victim] was present in that course.  
DETAILS OF MEDICAL EVACUATION AND TREATMENT 
After the accident happened, on 09:30 and the deminer fall down from accident point to the 
bottom of cliff, the first aids started by paramedic at 9:35 am and as the road leading to Kabul 
city was blocked by heavy traffic, so the team decided to evacuate the victim to Jalalabad. By 
9:55 am the victim was ready to be shifted to Sorubi district Hospital and then Jalalabad 
Public Health Hospital. He was admitted at district hospital at 10:30 am. After some 
stabilization and control of bleeding, at 12:00 the victim transferred to Jalalabad public health 
hospital. On 13:00 he was admitted there, after the operations completed on his injuries and 
further stabilization, the [Demining group] was advised by doctors to transfer the injured 
deminer to Pakistan. He was transferred from Jalalabad hospital to Peshawar (Pakistan) on 
the next day 23/12/2010 at 7:00am. He passed away in ICRC hospital on 31/12/2010 at 1:00 
pm.  
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PARTICULARS OF DEMINERS INSURANCE 
The [Demining group] staff including deminers are insured with State life insurance company 
of Pakistan. 
DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE ACTIVITIES ON THE DAY OF THE ACCIDENT 
On 22 December 2010 team arrived to the area on 06:30 and started operation on 07:00 
working for 45 minutes and then 15 minutes break, the second round started on 08:00 for the 
same working and breaking period. The third round started on 09:00, [the Victim] worked in 
his clearance lane using metal detector and then stopped on 09:25 wanted to mark his 
clearance lane. He picked up marking material/equipment attempted to mark his clearance 
lane. On the way back he slipped out from his cleared lane to un-clear area, his right foot 
came on a mine and the accident happened.  
TECHNICAL POINTS CONTRIBUTED TO ACCIDENTS 
The deminer slipped to un-clear area while attempting to mark his cleared lane, his foot came 
on a mine and the accident occurred. But the causes of his death seem to be fatal injuries 
sustained when he had fallen to the bottom of cliff from the accident point around 100 meters 
down. Operations assistant from AMAC central discussed risk preventive measures with 
[Demining group] after the accident happened and recommended that the ropes should be 
used to tie in deminers during the operation in order to stop them falling in the event of 
accident or slip. But due to loose nature of the ground in some parts of the minefield this was 
not applicable. AMAC conducted QA visit at the beginning of the task, he discussed the risk 
mitigation measures in such a way to reduce the target from 500 sqm area to 250 sqm per 
day and conduct full excavation and create staircases to stable the deminers during the 
operations in such a steep sloping area.  
[Demining group] developed SOP for working on steep sloping areas, but the risk reduction 
and or safety precaution in such a way to use ropes which has been practicing by other 
organizations is not covered there. This was not applicable at the beginning of the task due to 
ground conditions. 
The team practiced CASEVAC 2 times before accident happened, but the detail of evacuation 
planned, accident point and communication is not clear. It is not clear whether the rehearsal 
conducted only from the foot of the cliff to the hospital or from the upper part where the 
deminers are busy. The alternative evacuation root is also not mentioned.  
Although it was planned by [Demining group] to evacuate the victim to Kabul city which was 
close to the working site, but due to traffic jam in Mahipar pass, [Demining group] decided to 
evacuate the victim to Jalalabad. So the evacuation took almost 3 hours to Jalalabad and 
next day the deminer was evacuated to Pakistan for specialised treatment, therefore, the 
delay in evacuation of victim may also had contributed to the severity of his injuries and so led 
to his death.  
SUMMARY 
The accident happened while the de miner was attempting to mark his cleared lane. He 
slipped to un-clear area and his foot came on PMN mine and caused the accident. This 
explosion also caused the victim to fall down about 100 meters to the bottom of cliff from the 
accident point and get more crush injuries which seem to be the causes of death.  
CONCLUSION 
Carelessness of deminer and lack of comprehensive risk assessment in difficult worksite 
conditions resulted in accident and subsequent death of deminer. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT REOCCURRENCE 
• [Demining group] operations department is recommended to include the use of rope 
and sticks and creating staircases in their related SOPs and make sure its 
implementation where applicable in such steep sloping areas. 
• Internal QA cell of [Demining group] is recommended to improve the QA visits in 
order to catch such critical issues and make sure that a comprehensive risk 
assessment is done and risk mitigation measures are considered by the team.   
• The CASEVAC rehearsals should be conducted more objectively and include all 
possible scenarios as per all possible risks and worksite conditions. The alternative 
plans for evacuation should also be included. 
• The command group is recommended to implement a strict control on deminers at all 
times during the operations especially in such complicated areas.  
• The deminers should take extra care during the operations and do not ignore 
standard operating procedures and risk mitigation measures.   
Dr. [Name removed], BOI Chairman 
ANNEXES: [Not made available] 
Annex A: BOI - Terms of Reference 
Annex B: Site operations plan 
Annex D: Internal investigation report 
Annex E: Statements and Witness reports 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] FATAL DEMINING ACCIDENT  
INTRODUCTION:  
A Board of Inquiry (BOI) was convened by MACCA Programme Director to investigate the 
circumstances involved in the demining accident causing fatal injuries to [the Victim] the 
deminer of [Demining group] DT-13. The accident occurred at 09:30 on 22 Dec 2010 in MF # 
AF/0112/00169/MF 355 located in Shpoli Baba village, Sorubi district of Kabul province. 
SUMMARY: 
The accident occurred in task number 355 in a rocky area which is a hillside with a steep 
sloping terrain. The deminer was busy in marking of his cleared lane, slipped to un-cleared 
area, his right foot came on PMN mine and the accident happened. The deminer [the Victim] 
closed his cleared lane 09:25 and wanted to mark it, he came down to his starting lane, took 
the marking materials and went back to start marking. On 09:30 when he was busy in marking 
the stones on the edge of his clearance lane, due to loose nature of the ground and slope 
there, he slipped to un-cleared area where his right foot came on a PMN mine and caused the 
mine to go off and the accident happened. At the result of explosion he lost his right foot from 
below knee and fell down to the bottom of cliff and sustained more injuries including head 
trauma and other internal injuries during this falling down event.  
Finally the deminer died in hospital on 31 Dec 2010, the causes of his death seem to be the 
complications of severe injuries sustained when he had fallen down to the bottom of cliff from 
the accident point.  
CONCLUSIONS: 
Carelessness of deminer and lack of comprehensive risk assessment and difficulties in 
worksite conditions resulted in accident and subsequent death of deminer. 
RECOMMENDATIONS:  
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The following points are to be considered: 
• [Demining group] operations department is recommended to include the use of rope 
and sticks and creating staircases in their related SOPs and make sure its 
implementation where applicable in such steep sloping areas.  
• Internal QA cell of [Demining group] is recommended to improve the QA visits in 
order to catch such critical issues and make sure that a comprehensive risk 
assessment is done for each worksite and risk mitigation measures are considered by 
the team.   
• The CASEVAC rehearsals should be conducted more objectively and include all 
possible scenarios as per all possible risks and worksite conditions. The alternative 
plans for evacuation should also be included. 
• The command group is recommended to implement a strict control on deminers at all 
times during the operations especially in such complicated areas.  
• The deminers should take extra care during the operations and do not ignore 
standard operating procedures and risk mitigation measures.   
Feedback on any preventive and corrective actions taken by [Demining group] is required to 
be submitted to the MACCA office by no later than 7 days, effective to the issue date of this 
letter. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 911 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: 210 minutes 
Protection issued: Frontal apron; Long 
visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron; Long 
visor 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: severe Chest; severe Head 
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Leg Below knee 
FATAL 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "victim deminer died due to head trauma 
and internal chest injuries which caused broncho-pneumonia and septicemia leading to 
cardio-respiratory failure" nine days later. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the 
investigators found that the site layout, lane marking and clearance plan were unsatisfactory. 
The Victim may have stepped outside the cleared area without knowing he was doing so. The 
secondary cause is listed as a Management Control Inadequacy because the procedures in 
use were inappropriate for the terrain and the group’s management should have ensured that 
this was not the case. 
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The delayed CASEVAC was unfortunate and may have contributed to the Victim’s demise. If 
the demining group had not conducted an appropriate CASEVAC exercise, that should have 
been corrected.  
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